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[Crim. No. 8152. In Bank. Oct. 29, 1964.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, T.ED PIERCE 
et aI., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1a,lb] Oouspiraq-Oriminal-Oouspiraq Between Husband and 
Wife.-A husband and wife who conspire only between them-
selves against others cannot claim immunity from prosecntion 
for conspiracy on the basis of their marital status. (Over-
ruling People v. Ma7.ler, 82 Cal. 107 [22 P. 934] and disapprov-
ing People v. MacMunen, 134 Ca1.App; 81 [24 P.2d 794].) 
[2] Id.-OrimiDal-Oonspiraq Between Husband and Wife.-A 
wife is not a conspirator with her husband alone against 
others unless her actions amount to active partiCipation tran-
scending acts that would technically be sumcient to involve 
her in a criminal conspiracy with him, but which might be far 
removed from the arm's length agreement typical of that 
crime. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County dismissing one count of an information charg-
ing a husband and wife with conspiracy. Ralph H. Nutter, 
Judge. Reversed. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, William B. 
McKesson, District Attorney, Harry Wood and Harry B. 
Sondheim, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Ap-
pellant. 
Russell E. Parsons for Defendants and Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-The People appeal from an order of 
the trial court dismissing count 1 of an information charging 
defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy (Pen. Code, 
§ 182, Bubds. 1 and 4) to violate Corporations Code section 
26104, subflivision (a), and to commit grand theft (Pen. 
Code, § 487, subd. 1).1 
i 
[1] Criminal conspiracy between spouses, note, 46 A.L.IUd 
1275. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 18; Am.Jur.2d, Con-
spiracy, § 12. 
McX. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Conspiracy, § 4. 
lCounts 2 and 3 charged defendants with violations of Corporatioll8 
Code section 26104, subdivision (a), and Pcnal Code section 487, 8ob-
c1ivision 1. 
) 




It bas been the rule in this state since 1889 (People y,;!j 
MiUer, 82 Cal. 107, 108 [22 P. 934]) that when spouses con!": 
spire only bet,veen themselves, they cannot be prosecuted for 
conspiracy. (See also People v. MacMullen, 134 Cal.App. 81,"' 
83-85 [24 P.2d 794].) The rule was based on the common-law 
fiction that a husband alld a wife are one person. (1 Black-' 
stollC Commentaries ·442; 2 Blackstolle, Commentaries ·433,) 
The supposed merger precluded their conviction for con-, 
spiracy, which requires "two or more persons." (Pen. Code, 
§ 182.)2 
The fictional unity of husband alld wife has been substan-
tially vitiated by the overwhelmillg evidence that one plus 
one adds up to two, even in twogetherness. Thus, one spouse 
may recover against another in tort. (Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 
683 [26 Cal.Rptr. 97,376 P.2d 65] ; Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 
692 [26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70].) The reasoning is that 
if he tortiously injures her, or vice versa, he or she does so 
independently of her or him. The tortfeasor, though perhaps 
not quite himself or herself at the time of the tort, is clearly 
not one with the injured spouse. Indeed, the latter emerges 
more separate than ever, now that injury has been added to 
the usual marks of identity. I 
Likewise either spouse may be convicted of his or her cSrime 
against the other. Thus, a husband can be convicted for in-' 
fiicting corporal injury upon his wife (Pen. Code, § 273d), 
for placing herin a house of prostitution (Pen. Code, § 266g), 
or for failing to support her (Pen. Code, § 270a). Either 
spouse may be convicted of his or her crime against the 
property of the other. (People v. Graff, 59 Cal.App. 706, 712 
[211 P. 829].) A husband and a wife may both be con-
victed of conspiracy when a third person is a party to the 
conspiracy. (People v. Mason, 184 Ca1.App.2d 317, 367-368 
[7 Cal.Rptr. 627], cert. den. 366 U.S. 904 [81 S.Ot. 1046, 
6 L.Ed.2d 203].) Moreover, it has been held that a husband 
can be convicted of conspiracy with others against his wife 
(People v. Brown, 131 Cal.App.2d 643 [281 P.2d 319]), and ' 
2The rule that a husband and a wife cannot be prosecuted for COD-
spiraey was questioned early in this eentury (8mith Y. 8tate{1905) 48 
Tex.Crim.Rep. 288, 289-240 [89 S.W. 817, 820-821]) and was first judi-
cililly rejected in 1920 (Dalton Y. People, 68 Colo. 44, 47 [189 P. 87, 
88]). Since then, two other states (Mark8 v. 8tate (1942) 144 Tex. 
Crim.Rep. 509, 514 [164 S.W.2d 690, 692]; People v. Martin (1954) 
4 IlI.2d 105, 109 [122 N.E.~d 245, 246]) and the Supreme Court of 
the United States have rejected it. (UfI.{ted 8tate8 v. Dege (]960) 8M 
U.S. 5], 54-55 [80 B.Ct. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1568, 1565-1566].) 
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the logic of this rule would extend to a wife who conspires 
with others against her husband. 
[1a] The present case involves, not one spouse who has 
conspired with third persons against the other spouse, but 
a husband and wife who together have conspired against 
others. They now raise the stale contention that they should 
be protected from the law of conspiracy in the interest of 
their domestic harmony. The law, however, poses no threat 
to their domestic harmony in lawful pursuits. It would be 
ironic indeed if the law could operate to grant them absolu-
tion from criminal behavior on the ground that it was at-
tended by close harmony. Their situation is akin to that of 
a husband and wife who can both be punished for committing 
a crime when one abets the other. (People v. Eppstein, 108 
Cal.App. 72,80 [290 P. 1054].) Moreover, even in such situ-
ations domestic harmony is amply protected, since, with cer-
tain exceptions not relevant here, one spouse cannot testify 
against the other without the consent of both. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1322.) 
It would be specious to distinguish the present case, involv-
ing the conspiracy of a husband and wife against others, on 
the ground that however separate their identities, they must 
be deemed one when they act together for a common objec-
tive. If such an argument could be invoked to absolve people 
linked in marriage it could as readily be invoked to absolve 
people linked in any other close association, as in a secret 
society. Of course the closeness of the association intensifies 
the conspirator's involvement, but it is hardly reasonable to 
absolve a conspirator from responsibility on the ground that 
he had an exceptionally high interest in bringing the con-
spiracy to fruition. Any conspirator may sacrifice much, 
and perhaps most, of his personality for that objective. His 
very role as a conspirator is likely to be at odds with his 
individuality, whether he be a spouse, a bachelor, or a spinster. 
There is nothing in the contemporary mores of married life 
in this· state to indicate that either a husband or a wife is 
more subject to losing himself or herself in the criminal 
schemes of his or her spouse than a bachelor or a spinster 
is to losing himself or herself in the criminal schemes of 
fellow conspirators. Spousehood may afford a cover for crim-
inal conspiracy. It should not also afford automatically a 
blanket of immuMty from criminal responsibility. 
Certainly there should be no automatic immunity on the 
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of her husband, particularly in view of the advanced status:! 
of married women in this state. (See United States v. Dege, : 
supra, 364 U.S. 51,53 [80 S.Ot. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1563, 1565].) j 
It bears emphasis that, conversely, courts still have the re-'1 
sponsibility to guard against applying the law of conspiracy j 
to a wife solely on the ground that she has acted without ' 
compulsion. There may be situations where a wife is aware 
of her husband's illegal activity and even passively helpful 
to him in the everyday acts incident to marriage. [2] Never-
theless she is not a conspirator unless her actions amount to 
active participation transcending acts that "would technically 
be sufficient to involve her in a criminal conspiracy with him, 
but which might be far removed from the arm's-length agree-
ment typical of that crime." (United States v. Dege, supra,' 
364 U.S. 51, 57-58 [80 S.Ot. 1589, 4 L.Ed.2d 1563, 1567] 
(dissenting opinion); see also Krulewitck v. United States, 
336 U.S. 440, 445 [69 S.Ot. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790, 795] (concur-:, 
ring opinion).) 
[lb] Defendants finally contend that the long-established 
rule formulated by this court that would afford them im-
munity, should not now be overruled except by the Legis-
lature. In effect the contention is a request that courts 
abdicate their responsibility for the upkeep of the com- ,'" 
mon law. That upkeep it needs continuously, as this cas( 
demonstrates. In view of the fact that the fiction underlyin~, ,,' 
the rule in question has long been dead, we overrule People v. 
Miller, .upra, 82 Cal. 107, and disapprove People v. MtJO-
MulZen, .t1tpra, 134 Cal.App. 81. We hold that even when a 
husband and wife conspire only between themselves, they 
cannot claim immunity from prosecution for conspiracy on 
the basis of their marital status. 
The order is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Schauer, J.,. 
and Dooling, J.,. concurred. 
-Retired Justice of the 8upremeCourt sitting under aasignm.8Jlt b7 
the Chairman of the Judieia1 CouncU. 
(~ 
